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Absztrakt.  
Egy könyvkiadó vállalatot vizsgálunk. A kiadó kiadványait a szokásos értékesítési láncon 
(kis- és nagykereskedelem) keresztül értékesíti. A kérdés az, hogy egy új könyv példányait 
hogyan allokálja az értékesítési láncban. Feltételezzük, hogy a kereslet ismert, Poisson-
eloszlású. A készletezés költségeit szintén ismertnek tételezzük fel. Cél a költségek 
minimalizálása. 
 
Kulcsszavak: Optimalizálás, Újságárusfiú probléma, Játékelmélet, Készletgazdálkodás 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
The aim of the paper is to analyze a practical real world problem. A publishing house is given. 
The publishing firm has contacts to a number of wholesaler / retailer enterprises and direct 
contact to customers to satisfy the market demand. The book publishers work in a project 
industry. The publisher faces with the problem to allocate the stocks of a given, newly 
published book to the wholesaler and retailer, and to hold some copies to satisfy the 
customers direct from the publisher. The distribution of the demand is unknown, but it can be 
estimated. The costs consist of inventory holding and shortage, backorder costs. The decision 
maker wants to minimize these relevant costs. 
 
The problem can be modeled as a one-warehouse and N-retailer supply chain with not 
identical demand distribution. The problem structure is similar that of a newsvendor model. It 
is assumed that the demand distribution follows a Poisson distribution. 
 
Keywords: Optimization, Newsboy problem Game theory, Inventory control 
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1. Introduction 
 
Inventory games are investigated in the last years. A number of publications analyze 
newsvendor-, or newsboy-type inventory games. One of the first papers on this field was 
published by Lippman and McCardle (1997). They have examined  a newsboy-type inventory 
game with two players and dependent random demands. They look for a Nash equilibrium 
and investigate possible decision rules. 
 
Other papers investigate a similar situation, but more than two players. This papers are 
Montrucchio and Scarsini (2007), and Müller, Scarsini, and Shaked (2002). The last paper 
deals with the cooperative solution of the newsboy-type inventory game, and shows that there 
exists a core of this game. Another paper examines the connection between Nash and 
Stackelberg solutions of newsvendor problems. (Serin (2007)) She has shown that there exists 
such a situation, where these two type of game solutions have the same. Other applications 
examine the back-orders in solutions (Netessine et al. (2006)), and the multi-echelon 
problems of inventory control of newsvendor games. (Rogers and Tsubakitani (1991)) 
 
The aim of the paper is to analyze a practical real world problem. The publishing firm has 
contacts to a number of wholesaler / retailer enterprises and direct contact to customers to 
satisfy the market demand. The book publishers work in a project industry. The publisher 
faces with the problem to allocate the stocks of a given, newly published book to the 
wholesaler and retailer, and to hold some copies to satisfy the customers direct from the 
publisher. The distribution of the demand is unknown, but it can be estimated. The costs 
consist of inventory holding and shortage, backorder costs. The decision maker wants to 
minimize these relevant costs. 
 
The problem is modeled as a one-warehouse and N-retailer supply chain with not identical 
demand distribution. The problem structure is similar that of a newsvendor model. It is 
assumed that the demand distribution follows a Poisson distribution. We have chosen this 
distribution, because the demand process of selling books can be characterized with this 
random process. 
 
The paper organizes, as follows. In the second section we show the parameters, decision 
variables and the costs functions of the model. The next section deals with the properties of 
the model, and solves the model. The fourth section supplies a numerical example to 
characterize the structure of an optimal solution. And last we summarize the results of the 
paper. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
We will use the following notations. 
 
Parameters of the model: 
 
- n number of the retailer, 
- cf fixed costs of the publishing house, 
- cv variable costs of the publishing house, 
- p selling price of the book, 
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- h0 inventory holding costs of the publishing house, 
- hi inventory holding costs of the retailers, (i=1,2,…,n), 
- Di random demand for retailer i, (i=1,2,…,n), 
- λi parameter of the Poisson distribution for retailer i, (i=1,2,…,n). 
 
The probability of demand of the Poisson distribution has the next form: 
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We assume that the random demands of the retailers are independent. This assumption means 
that the cumulated probability of the demand for the publishing house follows a Poisson 
distribution, as well: 
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and the cumulated distribution 
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Decision variables: 
 
- Q0 the number if the books published by the publishing house, 
- Qi the number of the ordered books from the publishing house. 
 
We can assume that the number of published books is not higher than that of books ordered 
by retailers from publishing house. It is formulated, as 
 
0
1
QQ
n
i
i ≤∑
=
. 
 
This problem can be modeled as a one-warehouse and n-retailer supply chain. The material 
flow of the system is depicted in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Material flow of the system. (One-warehouse n-retailer.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let us now model the cost functions. The model consists of (n + 1) costs functions: cost 
function of the publishing house and n cost functions of the retailers. We model the case from 
the point of view of the publishing house. The publishing house wants to minimize the 
relevant cost, so that the house does not know the precise costs of the retailers, but estimates 
them. 
 
First we construct the cost function of the publishing house. We assume that the costs 
function consists of fixed costs, variable costs of the publishing house, and the sum inventory 
holding costs and lost sales. The form of the cost function is the following: 
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The function K0(Q0) is modeled, as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∑
∑
∑
∑
∞+
+=
∑−
=
=
∑−
=
==
⋅






⋅−⋅+⋅






⋅−⋅=
1
1
0
0
1
0000
0
1
0
1
!! Qk
k
n
i
iQ
k
k
n
i
i n
i
i
n
i
i
e
k
Qkpe
k
kQhQK λλ
λλ
. 
 
The first part of function F0(Q0) shows the average inventory holding costs. The second part 
is the average lost sales costs. 
 
The cost functions of the retailers are modeled as a pure newsboy problem. We assume that 
the publishing house has no information about the costs parameters of the retailers, only 
Q0 
Publishing 
house 
Q2 
Q3 
Q1 
2. retailer 
3. retailer 
1. retailer 
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estimations about the costs. The fixed and variable costs of retailers are totally unknown for 
the publishing house. The cost functions are 
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The goal of the retailers is to minimize the newsboy-type inventory costs. A retailer has no 
information about the ordering rules of the other retailers, so these decisions are independent 
each other. 
 
We can now summarize our model, as a game theoretic model. The problem is the following: 
 
( ) min→ii QC , (i=0,1,2,…,n),        (1) 
 
such that 
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In the next section we examine the offered model. We will show that this model is a simple 
game and we look for the optimal solution of this play. 
 
 
3. Some properties of the model and its solution 
 
The problem (1)-(2) can be interpreted, as a Nash game with (n + 1) player. We prove that the 
Nash solution of this inventory game is Pareto equilibrium, so the competitive solution is in 
this special case a cooperative game solution, as well. 
 
Property 1. 
The optimal solution of model (1)-(2) is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof. Let us assume that we have calculated the optimal solution of the problem, and optimal 
solution is values { }nioiQ 0= . Let us now first analyze the number of published books oQ0 , and let 
us fix the optimal retailer quantities { }nioiQ 1= . Then we solve the next problem: 
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This problem can be solved, and the optimal solution is a Nash solution. 
 
If we investigate a retailer i, then the next problem must be solved: 
 
 7 
( ) ( ) ( ) min
!! 10
→⋅⋅−⋅+⋅⋅−⋅= ∑∑
+∞
+=
−
=
−
i
i
i
i
Qk
k
i
i
Q
k
k
i
iiii ek
Qkpe
k
kQhQC λλ λλ , 
 
such that 
 
∑
≠
=
−≤
n
ij
j
o
j
o
i QQQ
1
0 . 
 
The solution of this problem is very simple, see for example Naddor (1966). With this last 
proposition we have proved this property. 
 
The property have shown that the equilibrium this Nash game can be calculated, as a Pareto 
efficient solution. 
 
Property 2. 
The Nash equilibrium of model (1)-(2) is a Pareto optimal solution, as well. 
 
Proof. The first property holds for the optimal solution of problem (1)-(2). Let us reformulate 
the problem: 
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The optimal solution of this problem is a Nash solution, and the cumulated cost function is a 
Pareto optimum. So the optimal solution of this problem is a cooperative solution of game 
(1)-(2). With this proposition we have proved that the solution is a cooperative equilibrium for 
this problem. 
 
This last property helps us to determine the optimal solution of the model (1)-(2). The optimal 
orderings can be calculated, as the optimal solution of optimization problem (3)-(4): 
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Let us now determine the optimal decisions in this model. The model (1)-(2) can be solved 
with Lagrange function. The Lagrange function is 
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The optimal solution for this case is 
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for the number of the published books and 
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for the ordered books. Here the optimal solutions are values oiQ , (i=0,1,2,…,n). In this model 
the optimal solution is determined in dependence of the parameter λ. A possible algorithm is 
shown in the next section. 
 
 
4. A numerical example 
 
The supply chain consists of the publishing house and three retailers, n = 3. In this numerical 
example we assume that the selling price is equal to 50, i.e. p = 50. The fixed cost of the 
publishing house is 100, i.e. cf  = 100, the variable cost is 20, i.e. cv = 20. We assume that the 
inventory holding costs are equal for the publishing house and the retailers, and h = h0 = h1 = 
h2 = h3 = 10. 
 
The distribution of the demand is Poisson distribution with parameters: λ1 = 50, λ2 = 25, and 
λ3 = 30. The problem (3)-(4) in our case is 
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such that 
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00321 ≤−++ QQQQ . 
 
Using the results of (5)-(6), the optimal solution is 
 
λ =11, 1090 =
oQ , 521 =oQ , 262 =oQ , 313 =oQ . 
 
The minimal cost of the publishing house is  
 ( ) 95.236400 =oQC , ( ) 79.13611 =oQC , ( ) 46.10222 =oQC , ( ) 643.11333 =oQC . 
 
The total costs of this supply chain are 2717.84. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have shown a supply chain with newsvendor-type inventory holding costs. 
We have investigated a real publishing house with retailers. The publishing house wants to 
determine optimal number of published books and the expected books ordering of the 
retailers. The random demands for books of the retailers are known from former demands. 
The aim of the publishing house is to minimize the expected costs so that the retailers 
minimize the inventory holding costs. 
 
To solve the problem, we have shown that this problem leads to a game-theoretic model. The 
players of the game are the publishing house and the retailers. The structure of the problem is 
very simple, so the Nash equilibrium of the problem is a Pareto efficient solution, as well. It 
means that in this case the Nash equilibrium is a solution of a cooperative game. 
 
In a next paper we can analyze a situation with not independent retailers demand, as it is 
assumed by Montrucchio and Scarsini (2007), or Serin (2007). 
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